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2006, xxii + 817 p.
Reviewed by Dragan Bakić*
Professor Sabrina Ramet is a well­known 
author specialising in the history of Yugo­
slavia and post­Yugoslav era who distilled 
her decades­long study of the subject in 
this book. Being a political scientist, she 
analyses the tormented history of the 
South Slavs’ state in the twentieth century 
through the paradigm of their inability to 
establish political legitimacy as the basis 
for state­building project. Ramet explains 
the tenets of political legitimacy in the 
first chapter setting a theoretical frame­
work for her writing; these are equated 
with the values of liberal project compris­
ing, above all, the rule of law, individual 
rights, tolerance, respect for the harm 
principle and state neutrality in religious 
matters. The central argument of politi­
cal legitimacy is, of course, unobjection­
able in itself but also rather self­evident, 
which thus raises doubt as to its utility as 
historical explanation. Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
for example, was communist dictator­
ship emerging from civil war and relying 
on terror and repression for its continued 
existence; it was, as any other dictatorship, 
an antithesis of liberal values and free ex­
pression of popular will. What is then 
the point of proving something that is 
axiomatic, namely that a communist dic­
tatorship collapsed because it failed to es­
tablish the rule of law and lacked political 
legitimacy? Another problem is that ret­
rospective measuring of historical events 
against the criteria firmly grounded in our 
times is always at serious risk to neglect 
or misinterpret contemporary historical 
context and consequently present a dis­
torted reflection of the past.  
Be that as it may, Ramet embarks on a 
lengthy exposition of the history of three 
Yugoslav states – the interwar Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia (1918–1945), Tito’s com­
munist Yugoslavia (1945–1991) and the 
rump Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and 
Montenegro alone (1992–2003), the fi­
nal stage of the country’s demise – with 
a view to vindicating her hypothesis. Un­
fortunately, even the most cursory glance 
at the content of Ramet’s book reveals 
glaring methodological deficiencies that 
render it completely and utterly unreli­
able. To begin with, one would expect the 
writer of a Yugoslav history to thoroughly 
research primary material in the Yugo­
slav archives unless he/she opted to draw 
entirely on secondary sources – which is 
also legitimate. Ramet has done neither. 
She has undertaken research primarily in 
the National Archives of the USA instead 
and managed to consult a single fond in 
the Croatian national archives in Zagreb 
(Hrvatski državni arhiv). She did not set 
a foot in a single archive in Belgrade, not 
even the Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Ju-
goslavije) the very name of which suggests 
its indispensability for what she was doing. 
In addition, her secondary sources clearly 
show the tremendous extent of her pro­
Croat and anti­Serb bias. Ramet heavily 
draws on a number of Croat authors many 
of whom were not reputable scholars or, 
for that matter, not scholars at all; they are 
often people who had participated in the 
events they wrote about later or recounted 
in interviews that Ramet conducted with 
them; some are widely regarded as promi­
nent Croat nationalists. It should be ob­
vious to any undergraduate student that 
their accounts could not be taken at their 
face value before being critically examined 
and compared with other sources includ­
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ing those from “the other side”. The same 
can be said of Ramet’s use of newspapers 
including the most extravagant propagan­
da. Needless to say, secondary sources and 
literature of Serbian provenance are con­
spicuous by their absence. Even non­Serb 
authors offering more balanced assessment 
of Yugoslav history are ignored, except in a 
few instances where their works were dis­
missed, although the latter are given in the 
bibliography for the sake of appearances.
A full list of factual errors, misinter­
pretations, intentional omissions, con­
tradictions, not to speak of typos would 
be impossible to compile here due to the 
space constraints of a review. What fol­
lows is just a brief overview of the most 
astonishing instances of the abovemen­
tioned which proves beyond any doubt 
that the author was not entirely guided 
by scholarly agenda. From the very be­
ginning, Ramet presents a picture of the 
failed attempts to form a viable Yugoslav 
state in which the Serbs are invariably 
cast in the role of vicious villains. The 
principle of national self­determination 
to which royal Yugoslavia owed its birth 
is disputed but Ramet does not suggest 
what the alternative was. With the benefit 
of hindsight, she inveighs against the fact 
that no referendum was held concerning 
the issues of union, dynasty and internal 
organisation of the state, i.e. constitu­
tional framework (p. 36). It seems that it 
does not occur to her that referendum was 
not deemed necessary because of what 
she notes herself: the Corfu Declaration 
of 1917 settled the first two issues by an 
agreement between the representatives of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (p. 42).
Nevertheless, the author is certain 
that the Serbs never entertained the pos­
sibility of treating the others as equals 
(pp. 35–39). To prove this point, Ramet 
puts forward a number of blatant false­
hoods – to be sure, the Serbs did have a 
preponderant position which is hardly 
surprising given that Serbia had been an 
independent country for four decades and 
a member of the victorious Entente Pow­
ers coalition. She claims all Macedonians 
to have been pro­Bulgarian because of 
which the Serbs terrorised them and “the 
Macedonians fought back”, a reference 
to pro­Bulgarian Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organisation’s (IMRO) 
“resistance” (p. 47). This is certainly a 
novel interpretation of what is generally 
agreed upon in historiography – leaving 
aside the question of the competing Ser­
bian and Bulgarian claims on Macedonia 
– namely, that IMRO carried out terror­
ist campaign in Macedonia against the 
Yugoslav authorities and those among 
local population who were loyal to the 
new state, and that the authorities con­
sequently clamped down on IMRO and 
their supporters among native population. 
In Montenegro, Ramet goes on, civil strife 
was waged between “the widely popular 
pro­independence ‘greens’ and the less 
popular but better armed pro­Serbia 
‘whites’” (p. 47). In fact, the whites were 
more numerous, but perhaps that is less 
of a mistake than presenting the greens as 
willing to accept a union with Serbia pro­
vided that Montenegrins were recognised 
as citizens with equal rights when they ac­
tually wanted Montenegro to be part of a 
Yugoslav federation and maintained their 
loyalty to the ex­king Nikola Petrović. In­
cidentally, the greens regarded themselves 
as Serbs and not a separate Montenegrin 
nation, but that is not mentioned in the 
text. In her treatment of religious mat­
ters in this region, Ramet should rectify 
her factual error that there existed “the 
Montenegrin patriarchate”. The Croats 
are said to have been repressed by Serbs 
and the competency of what had been the 
Croatian autonomous province within 
Hungary severely reduced. This is backed 
by the often repeated but nevertheless 
inaccurate claim that Belgrade dissolved 
the Croatian Assembly (Sabor) (p. 52) 
which, in fact, dissolved itself more than 
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a month before the creation of Yugoslavia 
after having proclaimed itself unnecessary 
in the new Kingdom. Other false claims 
are simply bizarre: Ramet would have us 
believe, placing her trust in the brochure 
of an IMRO/Bulgarian propagandist 
published in Budapest in 1929, that the 
Yugoslav authorities “shipped large quan­
tities of books from Croatia to Belgrade 
on the argument that they were no lon­
ger needed in Croatia!” (p. 50). Another 
such source is sufficiently reliable for Ra­
met to reproduce from it that “more than 
100,000 Croatia Catholics converted to 
Serbian Orthodoxy in 1935 alone” (p. 96).
Ramet’s account of the Second 
World War in Yugoslavia could best be 
described as closely following the lines 
of the communist­partisan mythology 
which served to justify Tito’s dictatorship 
after 1945 and have long since been de­
constructed. Although she acknowledges 
the Ustasha genocide committed against 
the Serbs in the fascist Independent State 
of Croatia (NDH), she does not fully ap­
preciate that the Yugoslavs mostly killed 
each other during the war. The revolu­
tionary agenda of Tito’s partisans that put 
the seizure of power before the fighting 
against the Axis troops – though they 
certainly fought against the occupiers – is 
entirely overlooked. On the other hand, 
her interpretation of the royalist Chetnik 
movement might as well have been writ­
ten by a communist apologist. Brushing 
aside that Dragoljub Mihailović’s fighters 
constituted a legitimate movement sup­
ported by the Yugoslav government­in­
exile in London and were the first guer­
rilla force that rose to arms against the 
Germans in occupied Europe, as well as 
one of the participants in the waxing civil 
war, Ramet portrays them as refusing to 
engage against the Wehrmacht from the 
start and turning against the partisans 
despite Tito’s pleas to join forces (pp. 
143–144). Nothing could be further from 
the truth. The Serbian insurrection start­
ed as early as 31 August 1941 when the 
Chetniks liberated the town of Loznica in 
western Serbia. Anyone slightly familiar 
with the history of Yugoslavia in the Sec­
ond World War must be equally stunned 
to read that after the defeat in Decem­
ber 1941 “Mihailović’s Chetniks barely 
maintained any presence in Serbia” and 
that the centre of their “activity moved to 
the NDH” (p. 145). Ramet insists on the 
instances of Chetnik collaboration with 
the Axis, particularly with the Italians, 
although it is perfectly clear that such 
activities were designed to facilitate the 
struggle against the Ustasha and, as she 
unwillingly concedes, partisans were also 
prepared to make arrangements with the 
Germans, as in March 1943. All this does 
not prevent Ramet from laying down that 
“it is more than a bit disappointing that 
… people can still be found who believe 
that the Chetniks were doing anything 
besides attempting to realise a vision of an 
ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian 
state, which they intended to advance, in 
the short run, by a policy of collaboration 
with Axis forces” (p. 145). The true sig­
nificance of this blatant misinterpretation 
becomes clear in later text covering more 
recent events.
Communist Yugoslavia emerged from 
the war and it was founded on the com­
plex and often contradictory constitutional 
settlement that breaded the seed of nation­
alist discontent – the federation consisted 
of six republics and two autonomous prov­
inces within Serbia. Ramet’s treatment of 
the developments under Tito runs along 
the same pro­Croat and anti­Serbian lines 
as in the case of the interwar Kingdom. 
She sympathises with the surge of Croat 
nationalism peaking in 1971 (the so­called 
Croatian spring or MASPOK meaning 
“mass movement”). Ramet considers the 
nationalists from the ranks of the League 
of Communists of Croatia liberals just as 
Serbian liberals from their own section 
of the communist party – the latter, how­
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ever, renounced nationalism and insisted 
that Serbia should mind her own busi­
ness and not interfere with other republics. 
The opponents of Croatian nationalists 
within Croatia are dubbed “conservatives” 
although one should expect that Ramet 
would find their more liberal antinational­
ism closer to her heart. More specifically, 
Ramet discusses four alleged grievances of 
Croatian nationalists: “the use of textbooks 
to suppress Croatian national sentiment, 
the Serbianization of the Croatian lan­
guage, the demographic displacement of 
Croats by Serbs, and the encouragement 
of Dalmatian sentiment in order to split 
Croatia in two” (p. 230). Without explicitly 
saying so, Ramet takes these complaints 
quite seriously although at least the latter 
two were unfounded to the point of be­
ing absurd. The claim that emigration of 
Croatian workers to Western Europe, for 
example, was a plot “to move able­bodied 
Croats out of the country, so that Serbs 
could take their places” (pp. 232–233) 
could only serve to point out pathological 
manifestations of chauvinistic hate. The 
language issue, in particular, reflected the 
depths of nationalistic frenzy as the Croa­
tian intellectuals gathered in the cultural 
association Matica hrvatska repudiated 
the 1850 Vienna agreement between the 
prominent Serb and Croat philologists es­
tablishing the common Serbo­Croat lan­
guage. Perhaps Ramet did not perceive this 
linguistic controversy as a manifestation of 
nationalism since, in her view, “pupils in 
Croatian elementary schools were exposed 
to the Cyrillic alphabet” (p. 312). She pre­
sumably knows that pupils in Serbia or, for 
that matter, Macedonia were equally “ex­
posed” to the Latin alphabet in what was 
envisioned as a policy of upholding the 
equality of both alphabets throughout the 
country.
If Croats’ grievances were legitimate, 
then they must have been provoked from 
some quarters. Indeed, Ramet charges the 
Serbs with being affected with “national­
ist chauvinism” both before and after the 
fall of Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb and 
head of the security service; in fact, na­
tionalism “animated a large portion of 
the Serbian population, from the peas­
antry to those on the rungs of power”. 
And yet all the evidence that the author 
advances for such a sweeping assertion 
amounts to a cryptic reference in a news­
paper and the lame jibe uttered by the 
prominent Serbian communist Slobodan 
Penezić–Krcun who “sought to pay Tito 
a compliment by saying that he had only 
one shortcoming – he was not a Serb!” 
But this sort of logic does not come as a 
surprise when Ramet even explains the 
flare­up of Croatian nationalism in 1971 
as a “reaction to the hegemonistic pos­
ture adopted by the Serbian and Mon­
tenegrin parties, the Serb communists 
within Croatia, and Ranković’s people 
in general” (pp. 242–243). The concrete 
nature of the hegemonistic posture dur­
ing this time, however, is not addressed at 
all, whereas Ranković was ostracised from 
political life of Yugoslavia in 1966. The 
fixation on Ranković is very revealing as 
he is presented as something of a com­
munist equivalent of Nikola Pašić and his 
Radicals, or “the Devil” as Ramet prefers 
to refer to them (p. 67). She professes that 
Ranković conducted “repressive Serbi­
anization policies” which “were concen­
trated in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Bosnia­
Herzegovina (i.e., against the Albanians, 
the Hungarians, and the Muslims)”; the 
elevation of Bosnian Muslims to the sta­
tus of one of the constituent Yugoslav 
nations is also construed to have been fa­
cilitated by Ranković’s downfall (p. 286). 
Once again, not a shred of evidence is 
provided for these categorical statements. 
One might wonder how it was possible 
for Serbian communists to supress all 
other Yugoslavs at will and yet be so im­
potent at the same time to prevent virtual 
confederalisation of their own republic 
with anomalous status of the autonomous 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina which 
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remained in Serbia but nearly became re­
publics in their own right.
As for nationalism among Serbs in 
Croatia, it is said to have derived from 
their religious distrust felt towards Croats 
– perhaps a reference to their centuries­
long experience with proselytism of the 
Roman Catholic Church, but the author 
remains vague – and the activities of the 
Serb cultural society Prosvjeta, “a forum 
for former Chetniks” (not a single name 
is given). In particular, Ramet finds it 
inadmissible that “Serbian nationalists” 
wanted an autonomous province within 
Croatia, or that Prosvjeta demanded that 
both Croatian and Serbian be recognised 
as official languages in Croatia and that 
the interests of the Serb community be 
protected through the agency of a Cham­
ber for Interethnic Relations within the 
framework of the Croatian Assembly. It 
seems almost incredible that the author 
does not comprehend, for example, that 
the request concerning language was but 
a reaction to the Croatian nationalist de­
mand for separation of Croatian from 
Serbian language: the use of Serbian as 
an official language in Croatia would be 
a logical ramification of what was, after 
all, championed by Matica hrvatska. This 
is a fine example of how Ramet turns 
hard facts upside down. She even poses 
a rhetorical question: “What would have 
been the reaction in Serbia if the Croats 
of Vojvodina had made the equivalent 
demand?” This would suggest that the 
Croats constituted a sizeable minority 
in Vojvodina and that was not the case 
– Hungarians were the largest minority 
there – and Vojvodina did enjoy autono­
mous status on account of its ethnic di­
versity (pp. 242–243).
The account of the history of both in­
terwar and Tito’s Yugoslavia with all its 
blunders and distortions is but a prelude 
for the discussion of the latter’s breakup. 
This is explained in simple black and 
white terms: for all the deficiencies of oth­
er non­Serb actors, Slobodan Milošević 
bore sole responsibility for the bloody 
war that ensued through his pursue of the 
Greater Serbian project. In Ramet’s view, 
that conflict was not a civil war, but rather 
Serbia’s war of aggression against Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, and 
later Kosovo). The utility of Ramet’s pre­
vious gross distortions and misinterpreta­
tions of earlier history becomes evident in 
her account of the War of the Yugoslav 
Succession (1991–99). To begin with, she 
designates all “Serb nationalists”, which 
in her narrative means the vast majority of 
Serbs, as Chetniks. Since Milošević is said 
to have masterminded what Ramet quali­
fies as the Greater Serbian aggression, 
which is, as she assures us, the same polit­
ical program as that pursued by Chetniks, 
it is only natural that the Serbian presi­
dent rehabilitated the Chetnik movement 
and “even erected a monument to Chet­
nik leader Draža Mihailović” (p. 389). 
The said monument is a sheer fabrication 
and, in general, Milošević embraced com­
munist legacy and partisan movement 
whereas his political opponents from the 
right stood for rehabilitation of Chetniks. 
But if facts do not fit in with Ramet’s 
construction, so much worse for the facts.
Historical falsification dating back to 
the Second World War is compounded 
here by another intentional misinterpre­
tation: Ramet denounces “the Chetniks” 
for imposing the principle of ethnic con­
dominium over majority rule in Bosnia 
insofar as they denied the right of Cro­
ats and Bosnian Muslims to detach BiH 
from Yugoslavia. She would no doubt be 
correct unless the constitution of BiH 
had been predicated on the principle that 
the three ethnic groups were constituent 
nations whose consensus was therefore 
necessary for any substantial change in 
the status of their republic. However, 
Ramet chooses to pass in silence over 
this crucial fact for understanding the 
outbreak of war in BiH (p. 419). Instead 
she proceeds with the list of pathological 
deviations typical of “Chetniks” which 
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includes their pride of “enjoying superior 
capacities for sexual performance” (p. 
420). If one would expect that the au­
thor is, for good measure, equally harsh 
in her treatment of Croatia’s role in the 
war, one would be very much mistaken. 
Despite admission that Croat veterans’ 
organisation displayed the Ustasha ver­
sion of Croatian flag and that Tudjman’s 
government fulfilled Pavelić’s dream of 
uprooting the Serbs from Croatia and 
strove to extend the Croatian borders at 
the expense of BiH, Ramet saw no paral­
lel with the political program and prac­
tice of the NDH. In fact, she almost ex­
cused Tudjman’s territorial ambitions on 
the grounds that he truly believed what 
Ante Starčević and Ustasha had believed 
before him – that all Bosnian Mus­
lims were Croats (pp. 421–422). More 
broadly, Ramet sees no inconsistency, to 
say the least, in the proposition that a 
multiethnic Yugoslavia had to disappear 
as an illegitimate creation while at the 
same time BiH had to be preserved at all 
costs regardless of the fact that it was a 
miniature version of Yugoslavia riddled 
with the same ethnic conflicts between 
its constituent nations and no more “le­
gitimate” than Yugoslavia was.
The anti­Serbian pattern is also ap­
plied to what was going on in Kosovo. 
Ramet admits the pressure exerted on 
Serbs by their Albanian neighbours in 
the Albanian­run autonomous Serbian 
province which resulted in a massive ex­
odus of the former throughout the 1980s 
and earlier. Nevertheless, she claims that 
the Serbs who had fled Kosovo from 
Albanian terror “began to talk of their 
own alleged sufferings and to demand 
special benefits in Kosovo”; because of 
that Serbia was “aflame with national­
ism” by 1986 (p. 305). Ramet would have 
us believe that from the 1970s until the 
late 1980s just a minority of Albanians 
favoured separatism (p. 511) although 
she herself described nationalist rioting 
in Kosovo in 1981 which has universally 
been recognised as separatist manifes­
tation. She would also have us believe 
that an estimated 400,000 Albanians 
fled from Kosovo from 1987 to 1989 (p. 
512), a fantastic piece of information no 
doubt designed to justify what would 
happen in the following decade. “Alba­
nians knew instinctively that the time 
for armed struggle had arrived”, reads 
Ramet’s explanation for the outbreak of 
insurgency led by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) in 1998 (p. 513). Ramet 
admits that the findings of Finnish pa­
thologist Helena Ranta gave lie to the 
official version of the alleged Račak mas­
sacre confirming that rather than being 
innocent Albanian civilians some of the 
dead were members of Serbian forces 
and others KLA terrorists (p. 511). Nev­
ertheless, the refutation of this fabrica­
tion exploited as an excuse to threaten 
Serbia with force does not evince any 
kind of explanation. The ensuing negoti­
ations at Rambouillet are grossly misin­
terpreted as having failed because of Bel­
grade’s rejection of a compromise which 
sought “to find a middle ground between 
the Serbian and Albanian positions” 
(p. 516). In reality, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was demanded under the 
threat of NATO military intervention 
to abandon Kosovo to NATO troops 
and agree to an eventual referendum in 
that province about its status which in 
practice meant to agree to an indepen­
dent Kosovo. Since Belgrade refused this 
ultimatum reminiscent of Hitler’s deal­
ing with Czechoslovakia in 1938 NATO 
embarked on the illegal bombing of Yu­
goslavia – without UN authorisation.
As it is well­known, the NATO cam­
paign ended in the establishment of the 
UN­mandated Kosovo in 1999 which lat­
er, after the publication of this book, was 
recognised by a large number of states, 
but not the UN as a whole, as an inde­
pendent state. Particularly cynical is Ra­
met’s subsuming of increasing ethnically 
motivated kidnappings of and assaults on 
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Kosovo Serbs after 1999 into the ordinary 
criminality rubric (p. 539). Such attitude 
is further emphasised when often fatal 
attacks on Serbs by “vengeance­minded 
Albanians” are simply put down to “the 
anger which had built up over more than 
a decade of repression by Milošević’s 
agents” (p. 542). Striving to vindicate her 
version of the conflict between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo in the late twentieth 
century Ramet again resorts to rewriting 
earlier history. One is simply astonished 
to read that the Albanians and Serbs 
“maintained civil and often friendly rela­
tions with each other well into the 1980’s” 
(p. 541). This incredulous claim designed 
to support the incredulous argument that 
it was Milošević’s rule alone that was re­
sponsible for what happened in Kosovo in 
the late 1990s runs contrary even against 
the evidence provided in the book. In­
deed, Ramet herself identifies five periods 
since 1878 during which the Serbs were 
persecuted by Albanians and four periods 
during which the roles were reversed (p. 
552).
The account of the War of the Yugo­
slav succession amounts to little more than 
a reproduction of wartime propaganda 
from the media outlets including, for ex­
ample, the accusation levelled at the Bos­
nian Serb forces of systematically using 
rape to spread terror and drive non­Serbs 
from their homes (p. 430). Ramet is espe­
cially prone to turning a blind eye to the 
raging nationalism of the Franjo Tudjman 
government in Croatia and minimising 
its unashamed flirtation with the Ustasha 
legacy. In her interpretation, it was “rising 
Serbian nationalism” emerging from the 
Kosovo crisis that “in turn infected Serbs 
in Croatia, leading to renewed difficulties 
in Croatia” (p. 306). Ramet would even 
have us believe that the Croatian com­
munists were about to win the elections 
in 1990 but “the rising tide of Serbian na­
tionalism, both within Serbia and among 
the Serbs of Croatia, produced a backlash 
among Croats, who steamed to Tudjman’s 
banner”. If Tudjman was guilty for any­
thing that was his decision upon assuming 
the office to authorise the firing of Serbs 
from Croatia’s police because they consti­
tuted 75 per cent of policemen (p. 356)! 
One can only guess what the source for 
this extravagant claim was since the author 
omitted the reference. Ramet is also more 
than generous in treating Tudjman’s mili­
tary involvement in BiH as opposed to the 
assistance that Milošević provided to Bos­
nian Serbs portrayed as aggressors – and 
war criminals – in their own native land. 
In a small but telling example she refers to 
“the Croatian liberation of Sanski Most” 
(p. 465) when speaking of the conquest of 
the predominantly Serb­populated town 
in western Bosnia in 1995 by the regular 
Croatian army.
Ramet’s interpretation of Yugosla­
via’s demise is perhaps best summed up 
in her endorsement of the Croatian Dep­
uty­Prime Minister in 1991/2, Zdravko 
Tomac’s “comparison of U.S. president 
[George] Bush’s handling of Milošević 
with Neville Chamberlain’s handling of 
Hitler in 1938” (p. 411). In addition to her 
profession that the Greater Serbian pro­
ject was “articulated by Ilija Garašanin, 
Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Vladimir Karić, 
and others, and embraced by Nikola Pašić 
and … King Aleksandar” (p. 99), a se­
ries of most important Serb political and 
cultural personages from the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, it becomes clear 
that she views the entire modern Serbian 
history as an uninterrupted quest for na­
tionalist expansion. Such naked condem­
nation of an entire nation comes close 
to ethnic­cultural prejudice at best and 
spreading dangerous intolerance thinly 
veiled as scholarship at worst, some­
thing that is exact negation of Ramet’s 
avowed espousal of the liberal project, to 
borrow from her discourse. With this in 
view, an important question springs to 
mind: is there such a thing as illegitimate 
scholarship? 
